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ABSTRACT  
A review of the epistemological basis of neuropsychology is done in order to clarify its 
foundations and its dual status as a discipline rooted in biology and psychology. This work is 
justified from two fundamental issues that are faced by neuropsychology: from an external 
perspective based on the upswing of certain disciplines, which by definition seem to have similar 
subjects of study to neuropsychology; however, given the complexity of the study of the 
relationship between the behavior and the brain, it leads to a duplicity of efforts that do not add 
anything to the understanding of the subject matter. On the other hand, from an internal 
perspective, the main issue appears when diverse theoretical positions are presented within 
neuropsychology as schools that must stand as if they were the only perspective. To provide a 
tentative answer, this paper reviews three theoretical approaches within neuropsychology: 
Russian reflexology and the cultural-historical perspective, connectionism, and cognitive 
neuropsychology. The conclusion leads towards a set of principles that, as a proposal, should 
guide the discipline development. 
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RESUMEN    
Se hace una revisión de algunos elementos que permitan indagar por las bases epistemológicas 
de la neuropsicología con el fin de contribuir a clarificar sus fundamentos y su doble condición 
como disciplina anclada en la biología y la psicología. Se justifica el trabajo a partir de dos 
problemas fundamentales que enfrenta la neuropsicología: por un lado uno de carácter externo, 
basado en el auge de disciplinas que por definición parecieran tener objetos de estudio muy 
similares a la neuropsicología y que si bien, es loable este esfuerzo, dada la complejidad del 
estudio de las relaciones entre el comportamiento y el cerebro, conlleva una duplicidad de 
esfuerzos que no aportan a la comprensión del objeto de estudio;  y por el otro, existe un 
problema interno al presentarse diversas posturas teóricas dentro de la neuropsicología a 
manera de escuelas que tienen a erigirse  como si fuesen la única perspectiva. Para ofrecer una 
tentativa de respuesta, se revisa de manera resumida los aportes de las ciencias cognitivas y la 
neuropsicología, para posteriormente presentar los supuestos teóricos de tres aproximaciones 
dentro de la neuropsicología: la reflexología rusa y la perspectiva histórico cultural, el 
conexionismo y la neuropsicología cognitiva. Se concluye con una serie de principios que a 
manera de propuesta pudieran guiar el desarrollo de la disciplina.  
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Neuropsychology is a discipline where a detailed 
understanding of how a complex structure is organized 
itself (the brain) with a detailed analysis of the individual 
behavior in order to establish their neuroanatomical 
correlates converges (Arnedo, Bembridge, & Triviño, 
2013; Junque & Barroso, 2009). It is clearly a difficult 
task, since it involves a huge conceptual leap attempting 
to integrate molecular and functional aspects of the brain 
(micro level) with diverse ways of human behavior 
(attention, memory, language, emotion, among others) 
(macro level) (Kandel, 2007; Popper & Eccles, 1993).  
That is something dangerous given the current 
spate of new knowledge and sophisticated techniques 
that seem to be marking the final victory of Spinoza’s 
materialism, to the point that it seems licit to use 
molecular biology and neurophysiology to explain 
shamelessly the complex ways of human behavior 
(Damasio, 2005). There are several voices that warn 
about the danger of scientific reductionism, in which 
Occan’s razor ends up selecting simplistic explanations 
that little contribute to real human understanding. As if 
this were not enough, there are several factors that 
influence this relationship requiring the practitioner to 
stop at his study in order to have a complete view of the 
brain-behavior relationship. Between these factors we 
find the environment (mainly the social one), learning, 
developmental stage and emotional and motivational 
states, to name a few (Kolb & Whishaw, 2008). 
Despite its contribution has been crucial in the 
set of progress made by the neurosciences, their 
conceptual and methodological boundaries present two 
problems according to authors’ opinion: an external 
issue and an internal issue. The external one is evident 
when comparing its study object with other related 
disciplines such as behavioral neuroscience that arises 
from the interaction between physiology, anatomy and 
psychology (Cooper & Shallice, 2010); or cognitive 
neuroscience in which study object is to know how 
cognitive and emotional functions are implemented in 
the brain (Enriquez, 2007). Although in the beginning it is 
a healthy effort since, as Benedet (2003) states, the 
complexity of the study object requires joint efforts from 
some disciplines, real contributions and 
neuropsychology development will be only possible to 
the extent to clarify its role in the neurosciences and 
cognitive sciences group. To achieve this purpose, it is 
necessary to have a solid epistemological ground that 
allows going beyond to obtain empirical data. 
The internal problem refers to various 
approaches that have emerged within the same 
neuropsychology, in such a way that today we speak of 
cognitive neuropsychology (Cooper & Shallice, 2010), an 
historical and cultural neuropsychology (Quintanar, 
2009), a connectionist neuropsychology (Geschwind, 
1965), or a neo-connectionist neuropsychology (Plunkett, 
2001). This situation is due largely to a fundamental 
problem of neuropsychology related to the delimitation of 
what is exactly what can be located in the brain: Are they 
functional systems, cognitive processes, or modules and 
distributed networks characters?, which will be 
discussed in detail below. 
An additional aspect is related to basic elements 
of the whole epistemology. In respect to 
neuropsychology, the subject that knows, the study 
object and the concept of real tend to converge in only 
one aspect.  A consequence of this situation is tackled in 
the philosophy of mind through three classical problems 
about the way humans know their world (i.e, the most 
etymological variant of epistemology): The first one is 
focused on the relation between the physical and mental 
dimensions, i.e. the mind-body problem (Damasio, 
2005, 2010; Martínez-Freire, 2007; Ramachandran, 
2012); the second one is associated with the source that 
produce mental contents, i.e. ¿contents are typical of the 
mind (being the innatism the most current version) or are 
they acquired through experience? (empiricism) 
(Jacobson, 1995); and the third one is a problem known 
as perspectives of first and third person (Churchland, 
2002; Gomila, 2003), which makes reference to the 
inherent difficulty to know the contents of mind in other 
people that are different from the mind of an individual in 
first person (Wilson, 2002). Answers of these questions 
influence decisively the understanding way of 
neuropsychology, and they need a reflection separately 
beyond the limits of this text. Thus, the objectives of this 
review will be enquiring about some epistemology 
aspects that support the scientific tasks in 
neuropsychology from three theoretical models  
To achieve this purpose, we will begin with a 
basic definition in which neuropsychology is a discipline 
that studies the relationship between brain function and 
behavior (Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004). As its name 
implies, it is located at an intermediate point between 
psychology and neurology or neuroscience (recent use), 
transform it into a “no man's land that is for everybody 
for the same reason” (Eslava-Cobo, 2009, p. 9). 
According to Kolb & Whishaw (2008), the term 
neuropsychology was first used in 1913 by William Osler. 
However, its use was only popularized through Hebb’s 
work in 1949 entitled: “The organization of behavior: A 
neuropsychological theory”. 
His classical work method has been about brain 
injuries and their relationship to behavioral alterations in 
an effort to associate such changes with its anatomical 
substrate. In a time in which neuroimaging did not exist, 
the neuropsychological methods constituted an 
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obligatory reference for establishing neuroanatomical 
correlates from clinical patient (Lezak et al., 
2004; Marshall & Gurd, 2010). It developed standardized 
instruments objectifying the observations made and 
several of its representatives proposed systematic 
procedures to select patients with similar lesions in order 
to validate their observations in a wider range of the 
population (Rains, 2004; Heilman & Valestein, 2003). 
Currently, with the development of non-invasive 
techniques for brain study, its role has been changing 
because it is no longer about identifying the anatomical 
substrate from the clinic, but to establish what are the 
alterations that result once it has been identified the 
precise site of injury. The aforementioned is in 
accordance with the view of the wide topographic 
variability presented in the brain functions. 
However, despite their undeniable contributions 
to the understanding of this relationship, some 
conceptual gaps arise and end up taking an eclectic 
position, probably based on pragmatism when it is 
investigate the model of brain function that underlies 
their scientific task.  
Thus, the brain is described from modules, 
changes are explained in terms of disconnections 
between functional centers, the work is done from 
dissociation methods and syndromic analysis functions, 
rehabilitation strategies are proposed from a 
sociocultural perspective, and statistical techniques are 
used to tackle the functioning in factorial terms, among 
others. From the methodological point of view, 
assessment tools are made from experimental and 
cognitive psychology works, and psychometric methods 
are employed to validate their use in specific population 
groups. 
Although this procedure has been partly justified 
by the very complexity of the brain, neuropsychology can 
only advance as a discipline to the extent that 
satisfactory solves a central problem related with the 
way psychological functions are organized in the brain. 
To do it, Luria (1979, 1983) argued that three related 
problems must be answered: 
• What is a psychological function as a 
psychological phenomenon? 
• What is the brain as a substrate of psychological 
functions, i.e. what are the principles of its 
organization? 
• How, precisely, psychological functions correlate 
with brain structures, i.e. what is locatable and 
what has to be understood as brain mechanisms 
of psychological functions?  
It should be pointed that despite the advances in 
neuroscience in relation to the understanding of brain 
function, these are questions that continue in full 
applicability because the current state of neuroscience in 
general and neuropsychology in particular is largely pre-
theoretical: it is full with a great quantity of data, but it 
has a lacking of efforts to theorize and pose hypotheses 
from that information (Churchland & Llinás, 2006). 
Actually, the question about what is exactly locatable in 
the brain, Llinás himself maintains that is not justifiable 
that neurons or specific areas were responsible of faces 
processing or psychological functions, as memory, in an 
isolated way (Llinás & Paré, 2006). 
With the purpose to provide concisely a general 
view that provides a little of clarity about it, this text will 
have two parts: the first one is orientated to present 
succinctly some conceptual basic elements of cognitive 
sciences and cognitive neurosciences. In the second 
one, they have been selected three perspectives of 
neuropsychology about the brain functioning that can 
contribute to the following: on one way to the proposal 
from the Russian reflexology and the cultural-historical 
perspective represented by Pavlov, Vigotsky and Luria; 
on the other hand to the connectionist proposal in its two 
perspectives: the one derived from Wernike’s models 
and the subsequent development from Geschwind’s 
works and the perspective originated from the 
processing models distributed in parallel. Finally, the 
cognitive perspective is taken, which is probably the one 
with higher boom in current neuropsychology. 
 
 
 2.1. Cognitive sciences 
 According to Thagard (2005), cognitive 
sciences are a set of disciplines that aim to study mind. 
He points philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology, 
artificial intelligence, neuroscience, linguistics, and 
anthropology as integral disciplines. In addition, it was 
originated in the decade of 1950. Although he does not 
specify exactly to what it makes reference in respect to 
“mind”, he emphasizes in the interest of cognitive 
sciences to clarify the way in which thinking works are 
carried out, indicating with this the operations that mind 
carry out to solve problems, learn, and think. Finally, he 
maintains that the main hypothesis of cognitive sciences 
is “understanding mind in terms of structures of mental 
representations in which computational processes work” 
(p.28), but he clarifies that there is not an agreement in 
respect to representations nature and computational 
processes that constitute thinking. 
On the other hand, Gardner (1987) considers 
that the theoretical bases of cognitive science came from 
mathematics and logic based on the syllogistic 
reasoning that involves the manipulations of abstract 
symbols. This proposal, which was initially formulated by 
Frege, was originated in a parallel way with the 
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appearance of the first modern computers and they were 
the base of the new science of mind and the artificial 
intelligence. A fundamental contribution was the work 
of Turing, (1950), who formulated the idea of a simple 
machine known currently as the universal Turing 
machine. Among its uses, Turing contemplated the 
possibility that it could simulate the human cognition 
because of the following assumptions (Michie, 2002): 
• Programming can be made in symbolic logic, 
which would require the creation of suitable 
translator/interpreter programs.   
• Automatic learning is needed to allow computer 
producing new discoveries in both the inductive 
and deductive ways. 
• It is required to prepare suitable interfaces for 
humans in order to allow machines adaptations 
to people and thus, they can acquire knowledge 
in a tutorial way. 
In 1956, the Symposium about Theory of 
Information was carried out in the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT), where cognitive science 
was formalized since the idea that all the processing 
systems follow the same principles (biological systems 
as the humans one or metal and silicon as the 
computational ones) and that its matter is constituted by 
an unified study field: cognitive science (Newell & Simon, 
1972). Thus, the main issue of cognitivism is the 
representationalism, which presents that the only way to 
tackle intelligence consists in working over 
representation bases that acquire physical reality with 
the form of a symbolic code in the brain or a machine 
(Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1992).  
Rabossi (1995) argues that cognitive sciences 
can be summarized using a minimal theoretical matrix 
about the following assumptions:  
1. Human beings and, in general, all devices to 
which can be attributed cognitive states and 
processes are processing systems of 
information. 
2. Information processing involves rules, symbolic 
elements with syntactic traits (formal), and 
computational operations (algorithmic) about 
these items. 
3. Cognitive processes involve information 
processing. 
4. The symbolic elements have a representational 
character; inner representations have a 
descriptive nature (propositional).  
5. The cognitive mechanism study demands an 
abstract level of analysis, i.e. a level that allows 
specifying the method used by the organism or 
device to carry out the informational function. 
6. This abstract level is the computational one 
(software); all cognitive processes are 
computational processes. 
7. All cognitive processes are implemented in a 
physical base (hardware), but the computational 
specification sub-determines the physical level 
of implementation since different physical bases 
can implement a same program type. 
Nevertheless, cognitive science faces several 
conceptual problems derived in large part from its own 
inner structure as theoretical model despite its incredible 
advances. Two of those difficulties are particularly 
interesting for neuropsychology: One of them is related 
to the real possibility of simulating a mental state in a 
non-human device. The argument known as the Chinese 
room is a mental experiment where a person that just 
can speak English gets inside a room full of Chinese 
characters. Outside the room there is a group of people 
that send instructions in Chinese in form of questions. 
He/she does not know that those are questions but has 
a book of instructions in English that allows sending the 
right Chinese symbol. Observers outside the room could 
think that this person speaks Chinese although it is not 
true (Searle, 2002, 2006). In a similar way, we could 
apply the Touring´s test to a machine or a brain different 
from the ours (problem of first and third person stated in 
the introduction) and think that it has intelligence, when 
actually it is a program that have instructions to solve the 
questions without requiring a real understanding of the 
type of questions that were posed. 
The second problem of cognitive sciences is 
related to the theory of information developed by 
Shannon in the forties and that today predominate in 
largely part of the computational development. The 
problem, as it is stated by Denning and Bell (2013), is 
that information processing is carried out in a different 
way from the meaning one, which constitutes a 
contradiction since it is the meaning that produces a 
modification in the receptor. The critic is relevant for 
neuropsychology because if brain is studied as an 
information processor, the question of the moment lies in 
that it gives meaning (or if there is actually a meaning 
attribution). 
 
2.2. Cognitive neuroscience 
 Kandel (2007) defines the neuroscience in 
general as a set of disciplines that has as objective 
unraveling the biological bases of mind. 
Whereas, Albright and Neville (2002) define cognitive 
neuroscience, in particular, as a discipline that studies 
the information processing from a biological perspective. 
This field tackles from classical questions as the way in 
which information is acquired (gnosia), the way in which 
that perception is integrated to produce movements 
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patterns (praxia) including processes that regulate 
learning and memory, and enquire about biological 
mechanisms that allow the executive functions, the 
social cognitions, and consciousness. To tackle such 
problems, several tools are used such as the single 
neuron electrophysiology, structural and functional brain 
imaging, genetic manipulation, neuropsychology and 
neural computing, among others. 
From a historical perspective, the development 
of neuroscience has been characterized by opposite 
positions about a set of fundamental subjects that have 
constituted in largely part its purpose and uses. Thus, in 
the dawn of the scientific study of the brain (in the middle 
of XIX century), discussions revolved around the 
locationalist postures (in which psychological functions 
were possibly associated with specific areas of the brain) 
vs holistic postures (in which psychological functions 
required the whole brain structure to carry out such 
functions). In favor of the first ones, there were the works 
of the pioneers Broca and Wernike, and the explanatory 
attempts of phrenology. On the other hand, there were 
the works of Fluorens and his cerebral ablation 
techniques (Kolb & Whishaw, 2008). By the late 
nineteenth century, the discussion was focused on the 
structure and function of the elementary units of the 
nervous system giving place to the reticulum theory 
(according to which brain tissue was composed of a 
large indivisible reticulum) vs. the neuron theory that on 
the contrary argued that the nervous system, as well as 
other bodily systems, was made of discrete units called 
neurons (Finger, 1994). With the advent of modern 
techniques for staining and microscopy, it has been 
possible to detail the neuron structure and function. Also, 
the old argument about the functions location seems to 
be solved with connectionism in its different aspects, but 
with the advent of neuroimaging studies, it seems to go 
backwards to a kind of localizationism (Bennett, 2008), 
typical of a modern phrenology. 
Much of the work in neuroscience has been 
aimed at understanding the details of the circuitry that 
integrates the brain tissue hoping to one day explain the 
psychological  functions through neurons, synapses, and 
neural and tracts networks. From Broadmann’s to 
Kandel’s work, there are contributions with a very 
complete view of brain structure (Purves et al., 2010). 
Under the surface, the brain architecture is a massive 
interconnection of wires axons, which are configured 
according to predetermined patterns. However, despite 
this intricate interconnection not all neurons are 
connected with each other, but they make networks that 
allow sending information forward, inhibiting it or 
returning it. Learning will determine which of these 
processes happens since it strengthens or weakens 
those connections (Damasio, 2010). 
With regard to the cerebral cortex, it is 
understood that much of the structure has a modular and 
columnar organization, in which the information 
processing occurs hierarchically and in parallel, giving 
place to an informational processing called “Bottom-
up/top-down” (Maldonado, 2008). From the evolutionary 
point of view, there has been produced a corticalization 
of the functions. In that way, functions that in older 
evolutionarily species were coordinated by nucleus are 
now assumed by specific areas in the cortex (as in the 
case of the colliculus, which in reptiles plays a role in 
vision and hearing, while in humans, despite it is still 
present, its functions have been taken in largely part by 
the occipital and temporal cortex respectively, leaving 
more basic aspects to the colliculus control, such as the 
orienting reflex. In addition, it is possible to distinguish 
primary and associate areas, among many other 
advances in the way it is organized (Papini, 2009). 
However, as in the cognitive sciences, there is a 
number of criticisms regarding its procedure and data 
analysis way. Specifically, the questions about Cartesian 
explanations are relevant to neuropsychology, where it is 
intended to replace the body by the brain, attributing it 
mental properties (Dennett, 1995). Another aspect is 
what Bennett and Hacker (2008) call the mereological 
fallacy, in which it is a mistake to attribute functions to a 
body that actually correspond to the entire organism as a 
whole. In authors’ words: "The attribution of 
psychological characteristics to the brain is not endorsed 
by any neuroscientific discovery to show that, contrary to 
our previous beliefs, the brain actually thinks and 
reasons, as we do ourselves" (p 35). 
As shown in this summary presentation of 
cognitive science and neuroscience, their work 
perspectives are different though its subject matter is 
very similar. In a simplified way, this relationship can be 
visualized in Figure 1, in which we can see that the 
neurosciences are based on the detailed study of the 
basic units of the nervous system, to then integrate this 
knowledge to the understanding of more elaborated 
ways of information processing. On the other hand, there 
are cognitive sciences based on a global understanding 
of information processing to try to establish how it is 
integrated with the most basic forms of that processing. 
The big problem that faces both disciplines is related to 
the way in which the different components are 
assembled and that is still today far from being 
satisfactorily solved. 
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Figure 1: Schematic relationship of cognitive science and neuroscience. Consult the text for an explanation. 
 
 
 
 
With this background, it will then describe three 
different perspectives that have contributed decisively to 
the process of neuropsychology consolidation. 
 
 
It is probably that some readers consider very 
little appropriate to place in the same section the 
theoretical and methodological proposals of Ivan Pavlov, 
Lev Semenovich Vygotsky and Alexander Luria. 
However, when reviewing their writings, each one 
(except Pavlov) has felt stimulated by the ideas of their 
fellow-countrymen either affirming or rejecting their 
theoretical proposals. For example, both Vygotsky and 
Luria, agreed that Pavlovian reflexes could explain the 
basic forms of brain functioning, but disagreed with the 
explanation of the complex forms of behavior from such 
mechanisms (Glozman, 2007). Nevertheless, their 
contributions together are largely the result of a time full 
of contradictions, but also fruitful from a scientific point of 
view. 
In this way and according to Luria the 
conception of brain as part of mental activity developed 
principally, after meeting Vygotsky in 1924 with Leontiev, 
a psychological approach that trained them to describe 
the way in which the natural processes such as physical 
maturation and sensory mechanism converge with 
processes determined culturally to produce 
psychological functions of adults (Cole, 2002). 
Luria agreed with Pavlov’s criticisms in relation 
to localizationist and anti-localizationist positions of the 
brain and suggested that the common problem to these 
positions is related to the way we understand the 
concept of psychological function as an indivisible unit 
and to trying to explain brain functioning from these 
global psychological functions (Luria, 1983). 
For this reason, Luria redefined the superior 
psychological function concept and its relation to the 
brain in this way:  
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"....the superior psychological function (i.e. the 
one that arises during life, and that is mediated 
and regulated voluntarily) is not a unitary 
psychological phenomenon that cannot be 
divided into constitutive parts, but the complex 
form of psychological activity that is incorporated 
in its structure for guiding motives, goals 
(program), business links (actions and 
operations that are included in them) and control 
mechanisms "(Luria, 1972, p. 15). 
Pavlov, meanwhile, considered that it was a 
physiologist necessity to unravel the mechanism that 
gave place to the functioning of those structures, 
opposite to psychology, with a scientific methodology 
based on physics, chemistry, and biology. Since he 
wanted to establish the laws that regulated the 
functioning of the brain hemispheres, he adopted the 
Sechenov’s posture, which described the hemispheres 
activity from reflex activity (Pavlov, 1997). In this manner, 
he assumed a deterministic posture to explain behavior; 
he developed the conditioned reflexes concept that 
tackles two basic processes: excitation and inhibition. 
Excitation was a positive process whereas inhibition was 
the opposite force that paralyzed the function. Thus, the 
main contribution to neuropsychology is focused on 
explaining the complex forms of behavior from a set of 
stimuli that triggers responses (conditioned or 
unconditioned) regulated by excitation or inhibition 
processes that activate or paralyze the organism 
response. 
In addition to being critical about the 
localizationist and anti-localizationist positions, he 
suggested that the function is the result of a complex 
reflex activity that group the common work of an 
assortment of inhibited and excited areas of the nervous 
system, which allow the creation of a system of 
temporary connections and ensure the balance of the 
organism with the environment through analysis 
processes and signal synthesis (Pavlov, 1997). 
Vygotsky, by contrast, was interested in 
scientifically explain psychological processes from a 
cultural-historical perspective, considering that the 
development of superior mental processes had a social 
nature. His studies were particularly focused on 
language and movement, and it was from this search 
that he made a number of principles that later inspired 
Luria to develop with Vygotsky a non reflexological 
psychology that was framed in the study of evolutionary 
development. This proposal would include the socially 
meaningful activity, and how to solve the problem of the 
relationship between superior mental functions and 
lower elementary mental functions (Kozulin, 1995). 
Regarding brain activity, some of the principles 
of Vygotsky’s theory were related to the postures about 
the function of the general and the partial elements, 
pointing it out as a product of integral activity of strictly 
differentiated centers and related hierarchically among 
them. Similarly, he makes the difference between the 
function of the brain as a whole (background), and the 
function of a part (figure), explaining that "the 
background in brain activity is represented by the lower 
psychological functions and the figure is represented by 
the superior mental functions, and vice versa" (Vygotsky, 
1982, cited by Akhutina, 2002). 
Thus, following Vygotsky’s thoughts  
"the specifically human functions that are 
acquired in social experience during training 
process change the functional structure and, 
simultaneously, its reliance on innate biological 
mechanism: if functions are determined by 
biological mechanisms in the beginning, the 
biological mechanism would be determined by 
the functions later” (Vygotsky, 1995 p. 42). 
 
It is based on these general approaches, and 
returning to Luria, that neuropsychological assessment 
should be based on a (structural) qualitative analysis of 
the symptoms under study, and specify the defects 
observed and the causal factors associated (Luria, 1969 
cited by Glozman, 2007). 
In this way, he proposes to carry out the injuries 
analysis based on a principle coined by Teuber as 
"double dissociation". According to this principle, "a local 
brain injury that affects all of the functional system is not 
only typically reflected in a unique psychological function. 
As a rule, a group of psychological processes will break 
up while others will remain intact” (Luria, 1972 p. 18)  
Finally, Xomskaya (2002) affirms, in relation to 
the neuropsychological system proposed by Luria, that 
this system differs from the “Western” tradition in two 
fundamental aspects: the first one is associated with the 
psychological origin opposite from the medical origin that 
was acquired by western neuropsychology; in the 
second one, the interest was in qualitative analysis of 
the alterations opposite to western neuropsychology that 
had special interest for the quantifications through the 
use of statistical and psychometric methods.  
It should be mentioned that some authors 
consider there are a huge similarity between Luria’s 
works and connectionist models (see León Carrión, 
2002 for instance). However, from a historical 
perspective, the basis in which Luria’ postulates 
emerged were based, principally, on the study of the 
brain in normal and lesion conditions. Whereas, 
connectionist appears to try to model brain from modest 
structures that are connected for the brain information 
processing. Although these are different ways that 
sometimes lead to similar conclusions, to deal with them 
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separately could help to better understand the 
contributions of each one. 
 
 
In the connectionist model, it is possible to 
identify two aspects: the first one appears from Broca 
and Wernike’s works, which allow, in the middle of XIX 
century, a way to analyze brain lesions based on 
diagrams in which it was described a set more or less 
specialized of neurons connected through a set of 
modest networks that were used to deduce a series of 
complex symptoms. This procedure allowed a 
classification, which prevailed until world war I, based on 
lesions derived from alterations in gray and/or white 
matters (Catani & Ffytche, 2005). It was a very useful 
model that made possible that authors such as Dejerine 
in 1892 described a case of pure alexia without agraphia, 
or Liedmann in 1907 who analyzed the effects of a 
callosal disconnection in respect to the motor function 
(Kolb & Whishaw, 2008). 
Geschwind (1965) takes these works and 
presents a pile of studies that aim at developing 
explicative models of the principal neurological 
syndromes from disconnections, especially those of the 
corticocortical type. That is why he went back to an old 
principle conceived by Flechsig at the beginning of the 
XX century, which stated that primary sensorial areas 
have mielyn at borning whereas association areas (with 
longer projections) get it during the ontogenetic 
development. Generalizing this principle, in the motor 
networks is the new Geschwind’s contribution. 
Nevertheless, it is more interesting that it was 
considered a second aspect related to the observation 
about the afferent networks that made a link to 
the  limbic system of animals, whereas in humans and 
some primates it is presented a higher development of 
the inferior parietal areas, where integration of 
associative networks of several sensory types occurred. 
Based on these elements, Geschwind devised his 
disconnection syndromes model in the following idea:  
“If associative cortex lesions are enough extensive, they 
lead to a disconnection of receptive or motor areas of 
other regions of the cortex, in the same hemisphere as 
much as the contrary one” (Geschwind, 1965, pp. 244). 
In this theoretical framework he could analyze 
the gnosia, apraxia and language with a completely new 
perspective. Subsequently, authors such as Damasio 
(1989) and Mesulam (1990) enriched the model with 
aspects related to directions in which information travel; 
it can move forward, behind or in a parallel way 
(Damasio, 1989; Mesulam, 1990). Although currently it is 
not possible to explain the wide range of alterations 
based only on disconnections, his contribution has been 
essential for the development of clinical fields such as 
neurology and neuropsychology. 
A second aspect perhaps less developed in 
neuropsychology came from processing systems by 
means of the integration networks configuration by units 
of simple processings that pretend to simulate the neural 
functioning (McClelland, 2002). At the very beginning, in 
the eighties, it appeared as an alternative for the models 
derived from the computational theory of mind. In this 
approach, mind was considered as a complex 
organization of systems in interaction, in which each one 
carry out a specific cognitive function and processes 
information through quasi- linguistics discrete symbols 
manipulation (Ramsey, 2002; Tienson, 1995). 
According to McClelland (2002), connectionism 
offers a completely new view of psychology theory 
nature. Connectionist networks configure cognition 
through activation spreading of many simple units. Thus, 
processing is widely distributed in all the system and 
there are not specific modules for an only task, discrete 
symbols, or explicit rules that regulate operations. On 
the other hand, there is a different processing that is 
defined as parallel distributed processing (PDP), in 
which a mental representation is constituted by an 
activation pattern of the units set of the processing 
model. This processing occurs thanks to the activation 
spreading among connectionist networks through 
balanced connections (McClelland, 2002). Nevertheless, 
it should be noted that connectionist networks constitute 
very simple representations since they are integrated 
just by units and connections. In the same way, 
connections can be unidirectional with an activation that 
move from a unit to another one in an only way, or they 
can be symmetric when activation spreading occurs 
among units in both directions. Besides, connections can 
have a nature of excitation or inhibition, i.e. the unit can 
stimulate or suppress the activation of another unit 
(Thagard, 2005). 
As it can be inferred, it is a very interesting 
model for neuropsychology because, among other things, 
it can represent complex patterns of behavior through a 
model that presents a huge similarity with neuronal 
networks, which are constituted by neuron bodies that 
allow creation of nucleus (gray matter) and axons that 
form connections in the white matter. 
However, it is not easy to use this model in the 
clinical practice because of the tools and the analysis 
levels of neuropsychology. The possibilities to carry out 
researches are linked to the development of informative 
models that simulate such networks. 
Perhaps the work line more productive in 
investigation has been orientated to develop informatics 
models from which are carried out the analysis of certain 
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tasks. Once the model has “learned” the task, it is 
damaged a determined number of nodes in order to 
establish the execution effect. It is from this point that 
neuropsychology analyzes this data and establishes 
relations with patients who present similar lesions.  
In the clinical field (and also the investigative 
one), evaluation instruments and information analyses 
levels of patients are based on more than a module 
perspective in which the brain is constituted by 
interrelated units that are independent regarding their 
development. It is a proposal that came from the work 
of Marr (1978), who warns about the intrinsic difficulties 
of confusing a computer with a human brain. In his 
proposal, he maintains that in order to carry out a 
complex calculation, such operation can fragment a set 
of relatively independent processes. He suggest also 
that from an evolutionary perspective, the unit 
conformation of brain would allow, as in a computer 
program, carrying out improvements without affecting in 
a fundamental way the entire system (Marr, 1978). 
 
 
In the eighties, it was produced a very 
productive approach between psychology and cognitive 
science that questioned the neuropsychological work 
that focuses its final objective on lesions locations 
through patient alterations descriptions as much as the 
inclination to establish functioning analysis through the 
average achievement of a patients’ group. According to 
authors such as Manning (1990; 1992), 
neuropsychology should go beyond and develop 
cognitive models that explain alterations in patients to 
constitute a model and not the lesion in the unit of 
analysis of the neuropsychologist in a normal or 
pathological state. His contribution is in accordance 
with Shallice and Cooper (2011) regarding the possibility 
of isolating and characterizing the operations of specific 
subcomponents of the cognitive system by means of the 
study of specific lesions. It is developed an approach in 
terms of information processing and the incorporation of 
a module perspective about the understanding of the 
brain functioning (Parkin, 2004). Those modules have 
particular characteristics that Fodor (1995) synthetizes 
through a set of features such as: 
• Informative encapsulating: modules carry out 
their operations in an isolated way regarding 
what occurs in other places 
• Control specificity: each module processes only 
one entry type 
• Obligatory feature: each module works in an 
“everything or nothing” mode in such way that 
once they are activated, they carry out the 
processing. 
• Innatism: cognitive system modules are inmate 
and are not acquired through development. 
Although the latter point has been matter of a 
wide controversy, in general, it could be affirmed that 
from this view the conceptual aspects of functions that 
are normally tackled by the neuropsychologist are 
devised. Thus, in respect to attention, memory, language, 
praxia, or gnosia, the analysis normally starts in the 
breaking down of the more molar aspects of each one of 
these functions to later provide a function interpretation 
as an independent module and in relation to the other 
ones that integrate the cognitive functioning. An 
additional aspect is constituted by the distinction of what 
Fodor calls main processes, which are different from the 
module processing because they would be responsible 
of integrating the information. Thus, they are not specific 
in respect to the aspects they analyze and in general do 
not have the said criteria for module conformation, 
according to Fodor (1995) they are: 
Slow, deep, more global than local, 
widely under voluntary (or executive) control, 
typically associated with diffused neurological 
structures, not ascendant or descendant in 
respect to their processing ways but 
characterized by calculation in which the 
information flows in all directions. First of all, 
they are not paradigmatically encapsulated: the 
higher it is a cognitive process, the bigger is the 
number of different domains in which it is based 
to integrate information" (pp. 4.). 
From this view, there would be two kinds of 
cognitive systems: The modules that would be 
calculation organization modes of vertical kind that are 
encapsulated and specific of modality, and main 
processes that would be formed of horizontal calculation 
organization, which are relatively independent of  the 
area and are not encapsulated. This would be the 
foundation of cognitive neuropsychology according 
to Benedet (2002) and the model in which is provided a 
huge quantity of data from current neuropsychology 
according to authors. However, some of them 
as Shallice (1991) agree that Fodor’s theory requires a 
review about the basic assumptions and being updated 
because of the recent developments. In respect to 
that, Farah (2002) considers that if the assumption about 
the informational encapsulation is accepted, it implies a 
specific location of such module in the brain. 
Nevertheless, lesions effects do not seem to behave as 
specific areas, but as an alteration continuum throughout 
a specific circuit.  
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In conclusion, it could be affirmed that 
neuropsychology is fed, at less partially, by the 
approaches of three perspectives discussed in this 
paper: the one that came from the Russian 
neuropsychology, the connectionism, and the cognitive 
neuropsychology.  
However, it should be pointed the need of 
assuming a theoretical posture that allow integrating the 
advances of a discipline within a solid body of principles 
that guide the interpretation and research programs to 
advance in the consolidation of this discipline. It is 
emphasized that neuropsychology is inherent to a 
neuronal aspect that supports different cognitive 
functions and to psychology; although these are 
processes that appear from a neuronal substrate, they 
have a set of independent features that can greatly 
determine the neuronal functional of brain (as what was 
proposed by Brentano) (Smith, 2002). 
It is from this intermediate point that its role is 
double: In one way, it should warn about the excessive 
reductionism when pretending to explain all the behavior 
by means of only biology; and on the other hand, it 
should avoid excessive mental postures that ignore 
completely the possibilities of a biological system to 
determine its plausibility. In the same way, the authors of 
the present work consider important that such programs 
of research add a minimal matrix of principles that can 
rule the neuropsychological tasks. Such principles could 
consider, among others, the following aspects:  
It is clear that the brain works in terms of 
excitatory and inhibitory patterns in both molecular 
level and in the performance of the most superior 
functions. For that reason, any theory should start 
from this fact as a cornerstone of work in 
neuropsychology.  
The information processing is performed 
vertically, in terms of bottom-up and top-down 
mechanisms, the former being less sensitive to 
learning compared to top-down processes, where 
previous experiences facilitate or hinder the process 
of the input information. As it was aforementioned, 
this aspect is a key to neuropsychology whenever 
the bottom up processing corresponds to neuronal 
functioning, whereas the top-down processing is 
related to the psychological aspects of the individual.  
It is necessary to note that apparently there 
is no exact correspondence between the observed 
world and the interpretation that the brain makes 
from that observation; it is probably due to the 
processing of top-down type.  
It is not possible to understand brain 
functioning without taking into account the deep 
interaction between it and culture, and that such 
interaction is probably made in a dialectical way,  in 
such a way that the brain evolves to the extent that 
culture is more complex and this, in turn, evolves 
thanks to the increased complexity of brain structure. 
It is also proposed to assume a perspective 
of evolutionary nature of brain functioning from both 
phylogenetically and ontogenetically view.  
Regarding the way the already said 
functioning is given, it is suggested to assume a 
Luria perspective, according to which a brain 
function is structured from sub-processes that may 
be involved in different functions while keeping some 
specific tasks.  
From this perspective, the neuropsychology 
objective would consist in identifying the sub-
processes that could be affecting transversely the 
different superior psychological functions, or as Luria 
would say (1983), neuropsychological factors.  
Finally, the learning variable determines 
largely the performance and brain organization due 
to its plasticity. Thus, the activities that are over 
learned assume a different brain fixation pattern, 
which seems to be from the front structures to 
posterior areas and/or from the cortex to the 
subcortical structures (e.g., reading and motor 
learning). 
There is a similar pattern of operation of 
each of the areas that constitute the brain, but how 
they are interconnected and related to fulfill a 
specific task varies from individual to individual and 
this differentiation is given by the ontogenetic 
development, and experiences and learning they 
have acquired.
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